

News From the Field

- Anduril, (fairly) new & huge defense contractor (drones, etc.) ...
- Palantir, BigData outfit (e.g., for spy agencies)
- US Army CTO on the new Battlefield Communications Network

“fundamental security” problems & vulns, and should be treated as “very high risk”

"We cannot control who sees what, we cannot see what users are doing, and we cannot verify that the software itself is secure," the memo says.

News From the Field

The memo said the system allows any authorized user to access all applications and data regardless of their clearance level or operational need. As a result, "Any user can potentially access and misuse sensitive" classified information, the memo states, with no logging to track their actions.

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```
graph TD; A["The memo said the system allows any authorized user to access all applications and data regardless of their clearance level or operational need. As a result, 'Any user can potentially access and misuse sensitive' classified information, the memo states, with no logging to track their actions."] --> B["No logging -> Audit not possible.  
No compromise recording -> forensics will be very challenging"]; A --> C["Ambient Authority! No separation of privilege. Hence, impossible to approximate the principle of least privilege.  
  
Clear indication that security is an afterthought."];
```

No logging -> Audit not possible.
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Ambient Authority! No separation of privilege. Hence, impossible to approximate the principle of least privilege.

Clear indication that security is an afterthought.

Control Transfers

Control transfers change control flow of programs

- Can be predicated on results of a previous comparison (flag bits)
- Arithmetic, logic instructions also set flags (omitted before for brevity)

Distinction between *jumps* and *calls*

- Jumps simply transfer control with no side effects
- Calls used to implement procedures

Distinction between *direct* and *indirect* transfers (*indirect* also known as computed transfers)

- Direct transfers use relative offsets, indirect transfers are absolute (through a register or memory reference)

Instruction Side Effects


Described in the Intel Programmers Manual

- Human readable text
- Hard to parse/understand for computer programs
- Sometimes incomplete

Use the BAP (Binary Analysis Platform)

- BAP features the BAP intermediate language (BIL)
- Make all side effects explicit
- Supports most x86/x86_64 instructions
- Lacks support for some “obscure” SSE instructions

BIL Example



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar displaying 'bap.ece.cmu.edu'. The page title is 'BAP: Binary An...'. The main content area features a navigation menu with links: Home, Meet BAP, Documentation, Support, Download, Links, and Credits. Below the menu, there is a paragraph of text: 'Computational framework for analyzing the intended BIL code to understand what the binary will do.' A code block is displayed, containing BIL code for an 'add' instruction. The code defines temporary variables T_t1 and T_t2, updates R_RBX, and sets condition codes R_CF, R_OF, R_AF, R_SF, and R_ZF. The code is as follows:

```
addr 0x0 @asm "add    %rax,%rbx"
label pc_0x0
T_t1:u64 = R_RBX:u64
T_t2:u64 = R_RAX:u64
R_RBX:u64 = R_RBX:u64 + T_t2:u64
R_CF:bool = R_RBX:u64 < T_t1:u64
R_OF:bool = high:bool((T_t1:u64 ^ ~T_t2:u64) & (T_t1:u64 ^ R_RBX:u64
))
R_AF:bool = 0x10:u64 == (0x10:u64 & (R_RBX:u64 ^ T_t1:u64 ^ T_t2:u64
))
R_PF:bool =
  ~low:bool(let T_acc:u64 := R_RBX:u64 >> 4:u64 ^ R_RBX:u64 in
    let T_acc:u64 := T_acc:u64 >> 2:u64 ^ T_acc:u64 in
      T_acc:u64 >> 1:u64 ^ T_acc:u64)
R_SF:bool = high:bool(R_RBX:u64)
R_ZF:bool = 0:u64 == R_RBX:u64
```

BIL code for `add %rax, %rbx`

Control Transfers (Part I)

Instruction	Condition	Description
jmp x	unconditional	Direct or indirect jump
je/jz x	ZF	Jump if equal
jne/jnz x	$\neg$ ZF	Jump if not equal
j1 x	$SF \oplus OF$	Jump if less (signed)
jle x	$(SF \oplus OF) \vee ZF$	Jump if less or equal
jg x	$\neg (SF \oplus OF) \wedge \neg ZF$	Jump if greater (signed)
jb x	CF	Jump if below (unsigned)
ja x	$\neg CF \wedge \neg ZF$	Jump if above (unsigned)
js x	SF	Jump if negative

Procedures

```
int f(int x) {return    x + 1; }  
int g(int x) {return    f(x); }  
int h(int x) {return f(x *2); }
```

Procedures (functions) are intrinsically linked to the stack

- Provides space for local variables
- Records where to return to
- Used to pass arguments (sometimes)


Implemented using stack frames

- Also known as activation records

Control Transfers (Part II)


Instruction	Effect	Description
call x	$\text{rsp} \leftarrow \text{rsp} - 8$	Decrement rsp by 8
	$\text{Mem}(\text{rsp}) \leftarrow \text{Succ}(\text{rip})$	Store successor
	$\text{rip} \leftarrow \text{Addr}(x)$	Jump to address
ret	$\text{rip} \leftarrow \text{Mem}(\text{rsp})$	Pop successor into rip
	$\text{rsp} \leftarrow \text{rsp} + 8$	Increment rsp by 8

Stack Frame




```
1  int auth(const char* user) {  
2      size_t i;  
3      char buf[16];  
4      strncpy(buf, user, sizeof(buf));  
5      buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\\0';  
6      for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++)  
7          buf[i] ^= 0xe5;  
8      return !memcmp(buf, "secret", 6);  
9  }
```

Stack Frame




```
1  auth:
2      ...
3      mov rdi, rax
4      call strncpy
5      mov byte [rbp-0x11], 0x00
6      ...
7
8  strncpy:
9      push rbp
10     mov rbp, rsp
11     sub rsp, 0x30
12     ...
13     add rsp, 0x30
14     pop rbp
15     ret
```

Stack Frame




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
Stack Frame




Stack Frame




Stack Frame



Stack Frame




Stack Frame



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Stack Frame



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Procedure Arguments

Standards (*calling conventions*) exist for argument passing

- Specify where arguments are passed (registers, stack)
- Specify the caller and callee's responsibilities
 - Who deallocates argument space on the stack?
 - Which registers can be clobbered, and who must save them?

Why do we need standards?

- There are many ways to pass arguments
- How would code compiled by different developers and toolchains interoperate?

Calling Conventions

We often speak of *callers* and *callees*

- Caller: Code that invokes a procedure
- Callee: Procedure invoked by another function

Conventions must specify how registers must be dealt with

- Could always save them, but that is inefficient (why?)
- Usually, some registers can be overwritten (clobbered), others cannot
- Registers that can be clobbered: *caller* saved
- Registers that must not be clobbered: *callee* saved

cdecl

We've been concentrating on x86_64, but cdecl is important to know

- Linux 32 bit calling convention

Arguments

- Passed on the stack
- Pushed *right to left* (reverse order)

Registers

- eax, edx, ecx are *caller* saved
- Remainder are *callee* saved

Return value in eax

Caller deallocates arguments on stack after return

stdcall

stdcall_fn:

...

pop ebp

ret 0x10 ; *return with an operand*

- Calling convention used by the Win32 API
- Almost identical to cdecl
- **But**, *callee* deallocates arguments on the stack
 - Can you think of a reason why this is better or worse than cdecl? (Hint: printf())

SysV AMD64 ABI

x86_64 calling convention used on Linux, Solaris, FreeBSD, Mac OS X

- This is what you'll see most often in this course

First six arguments passed in registers

- rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx, r8, r9
 - Except syscalls, rcx → r10
- Additional arguments spill to stack

Return value in rax

SysV AMD64 ABI Example

```
int auth( const char * user) {  
    size_t i;  
    char buf[16];  
    strncpy(buf, user, sizeof (buf));
```

auth:

push rbp	; save previous frame pointer
mov rbp, rsp	; set new frame pointer
sub rsp, 0x30	; allocate space for locals (i, buf)
movabs rdx, 0x10	; move sizeof(buf) to rdx
lea rax, [rbp-0x20]	; get the address of buf on the stack
mov qword [rbp-0x08], rdi	; move user pointer into stack
mov rsi, qword [rbp-0x08]	; move user pointer back into rsi
mov rdi, rax	; move buf into rdi
call strncpy	; call strncpy(rdi, rsi, rdx)
...	

Writing in Assembly

```
> yasm -- version
```

```
yasm 1.3.0
```

- Ok, enough review, let's write a program
- In keeping with the slides, we'll use an Intel syntax assembler called yasm
 - nasm is equivalent for this course
 - Feel free to use gas if you can't stand Intel syntax
- Let's write the simplest possible program
 - Immediately exit with status code 0

Hello World in Assembly

```
bits 64          ; we are writing a 64-bit program
section .text    ; we will place this in the .text (code) section

extern _exit     ; we are referencing an external function (exit)
                 ; libc functions are prefixed with '_'

global _start    ; declare _start as global symbol
                 ; this preserves a symbol table entry
_start:         ; _start is the default ELF entry point
    mov rdi, 0x00 ; zero out rdi, our first argument
    call _exit    ; call exit(rdi=0)
    int3         ; raise a breakpoint trap if we get here
                 ; (we should never get here)
```

Assembling and Linking

```
> yasm -f elf64 -o exit.o exit.asm
> ld -o exit exit.o -lc
> /lib/ld-2.18.so ./exit
> echo $?
0
```

1. We first assemble the program to an object file exit.o
2. We link an ELF exe against libc
3. We run it using a given runtime loader
 - You might need to specify a different path
 - Or, you might not need to specify it on your system
4. It returns 0!

Disassembly

Disassembling is the process of recovering assembly from machine code

- Not to be confused with decompilation!
- Requires knowledge of binary format and ISA

Distinction between linear sweep and recursive descent disassembly

- Linear sweep begins at an address and continues sequentially until the buffer is exhausted
- Recursive descent disassembly begins at an address and follows program control flow, discovering all reachable code